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CHARLES ELMORE CROPLEY

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1949.

No. 765

FRANCIS H. MONTMARQUET, d/b/a
O. C. MANUFACTURING COMPANY,

Petitioner,

—against—

JOHNSON & JOHNSON,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

MORRIS KIRSCHSTEIN,
Attorney for Petitioner.

Of Counsel:
JACOB T. BASSECHES,
JAMES V. McNAMARA.

INDEX

PAGE

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Summary Statement of Matter Involved 1

Involved Here Is a Question of Procedure Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure .. 5

Jurisdiction of This Court 6

The Questions Presented 6

Reasons Relied on for Allowance of the Writ 7

Prayer 7

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Opinions of the Courts Below 9

Jurisdiction 9

Statement of the Case 9

Specification of Errors 10

ARGUMENT:

I. The Court of Appeals has decided an important question of Federal Law on which there are conflicting decisions by Circuit Courts of Appeals and by District Courts 10

II. The Court of Appeals has decided an important question of Federal Law which has not been, but should be, settled by this Court 13

Table of Cases Cited

PAGE

American Optical Co. v. New Jersey Optical Co., 58 F. Supp. 601, 605, D. C., D. Massachusetts 12

Baker v. First Nat. Stores, 64 F. Supp. 979, D. C., D. Massachusetts 12

Bliss Co. v. Cold Metal Process Co., 47 F. Supp. 897, 899, D. C., N. D. Ohio, E. D. 12

Bowers v. E. J. Rose Mfg. Co., 149 F. 2d 612, C. C. A. 9 11

Davison Chemical Corp. v. Joliet Chemicals, 179 F. 2d 793, C. C. A. 7 12

Engineering Specialties Co. v. Burgess Battery Co., 40 F. Supp. 1014, D. C., S. D. New York 11

Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland v. United States, 187 U. S. 315, 320 14

Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 93 L. Ed. 492 10

Juniper Mills v. J. W. Landenberger & Co., 6 F. R. D. 463, D. C., E. D. Pennsylvania 13

Refractolite Corporation v. Prismo Holding Corporation, 25 F. Supp. 965, D. C., S. D. New York 12

Weil v. N. J. Richman Co., 34 F. Supp. 401, D. C., S. D. New York 11

Statutes and Rules Cited

Judicial Code, Title 28, §1254 (1) 6

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 5

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1949.

No.

FRANCIS H. MONTMARQUET, d/b/a
O. C. MANUFACTURING COMPANY,

Petitioner,

—against—

JOHNSON & JOHNSON,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

To the Honorable the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States:

Your petitioner, Francis H. Montmarquet, doing business as the O. C. Manufacturing Company, respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit entered January 23, 1950.

A certified transcript of the record in the case including the proceedings in the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit is furnished herewith in compliance with Rule 38 of this Court.

Summary Statement of Matter Involved

Petitioner sued respondent in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey for infringement of

United States Letters Patent No. 2,301,066 issued to petitioner on November 3, 1942 for an athletic supporter.

After filing of an answer and counterclaim for declaratory judgment (6a)* and after petitioner's reply to the counterclaim (12a), respondent moved under Rule 56** of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for a summary judgment holding the patent invalid and not infringed (13a). Respondent, in support of the motion relied upon the pleadings and proceedings theretofore had and upon the file wrapper of the patent in suit (14a). The District Judge granted respondent's motion in an opinion stating that the facts were clear and uncontroverted and upon the theory that all the physical evidence material to a decision was in the record (25a).

Actually in so doing, as will hereinafter appear, the District Court summarily disposed of a genuine issue as to a material fact; and involved here is an important question of procedure under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure heretofore undecided by this Court.

The District Court held the patent invalid on the ground that it was anticipated (39a) by a British patent to Cartledge, No. 494,393 (61a). This patent was a reference over which the Patent Office had allowed the patent at bar to issue (35a).

As a subsidiary reason for the finding of invalidity, the Court held that petitioner's patent lacked invention (39a) over Johnson patent No. 1,155,659 (60a) issued in 1915.

The District Judge also held that because petitioner's patent was invalid, it could not be infringed (42a).

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* We shall refer to the transcript of record by page number with the character "a" appended thereto to indicate that the page is in the appendix attached to the brief of appellant before the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

** The pertinent portions of Rule 56 are set out at pages 5-6.

Petitioner's patent is for an athletic supporter, better known as a "jock strap". The patented supporter includes a belt, and a pouch which depends from the lower front edge of the belt. The part of the belt to which the upper edge of the pouch is attached consists of two overlapping angular sections. These overlapping sections have a common, single, lower edge which is substantially horizontal. To this common edge at the bottom of the belt the upper edge of the pouch is attached. The combined pouch and belt as described have the effect of cupping the pouch into form-fitting position [Montmarquet patent (58a) p. 2, col. 1, line 50 *et seq.* and p. 2, col. 2, line 2 *et seq.*], and also tends to maintain the belt in position even after violent exercise without discomfort to the wearer [Montmarquet patent (58a) p. 2, col. 1, lines 55-73].

The claimed novel feature of petitioner's patent resides in the foregoing overlapped angular sections with the common horizontal bottom edge to which the upper edge of the pouch is attached.

The British Cartledge patent includes a belt and a pouch. In the drawings of this patent (64-1/2a) the front of the belt is not shown to have any overlapping angular sections. The only common edge disclosed in the British patent is the vertical meeting edge of the ends of the belt referred to in the patent as "the joint 2". This edge is not attached to the pouch. In the description of the patent, the following language appears (62a):

> "Of course, joint 2 need not necessarily be the ends of the band, for, though not preferred, the angle may be provided by a fold while the ends may meet anywhere [60] around the body."

The District Court in holding petitioner's patent invalid over the British patent interpreted this language to mean

the provision of a fold "identical with" petitioner's (38a). Both the Commissioner of Patents and petitioner's affidavit hereinafter referred to (petitioner is qualified in the affidavit as an expert in the field) are in disagreement with the District Court's interpretation of the above quoted language of the British patent.

The Johnson patent is for a catamenial belt. The front of the belt includes crossed angular portions similar to those in the belt front of the petitioner's patent. The Johnson patent has no pouch. The belt front of the Johnson patent is designed to be attached by a safety pin to one end of a sanitary napkin. There is no reason or purpose for this belt to shape the napkin and, even if there were, the interpositioning of the safety pin would prevent such shaping.

After the Court handed down an opinion in respondent's favor, petitioner moved for reargument and submitted two supporting affidavits, one by petitioner and the other by a duly registered physician, Dr. Mabee.

Petitioner's affidavit (43 a-2) pointed out that the fold mentioned in the British patent is a vertical fold which does not result from overlapping of the material of the belt and which serves the same purpose as and is a modified form of the vertical seam or joint 2. In other words, according to the affidavit, this modification referred to in the quoted language, like the joint 2, did not suggest or serve the purpose of petitioner's angular overlapped sections having a horizontal bottom edge to which the pouch is attached.

Petitioner's affidavit also stated that the function of an athletic supporter was to press against the body so as to give a lifting and supporting action; whereas in a catamenial supporter (the Johnson patent), pressure against the body was positively to be avoided. Dr. Mabee's affi-

davit stated that the function of a catamenial support was not to lift a sanitary napkin into contact with the body, but rather to minimize such force as much as possible.

Under these circumstances, in granting the motion for summary judgment and holding petitioner's patent invalid for lack of invention over the Cartledge patent and the Johnson patent, the District Court decided a genuine issue of a material fact contrary to the provisions of Rule 56.

The Court of Appeals on January 23, 1950 affirmed the judgment of the District Court upon the opinion below without a discussion of the facts or of the law.

Involved Here Is a Question of Procedure Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

The pertinent portions of Rule 56 as it existed at the time the motion was made on January 15, 1948 read as follows:

> Rule 56. Summary Judgment.
>
> * * * * *
>
> (b) For Defending Party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought may, at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof.
>
> (c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The motion shall be served at least 10 days before the time specified for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith

if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

* * * * *

Jurisdiction of This Court

Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under the Judicial Code, Title 28, Section 1254 (1).

The Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit which petitioner seeks to have reviewed was entered on January 23, 1950.

The Questions Presented

The questions petitioner seeks to have reviewed by this Court are:

1. Is not a genuine issue of fact decided in violation of section (c) of Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when a court on motion for summary judgment invalidates a duly issued United States Letters Patent for lack of invention over prior art, there being a contest on that issue?

2. Is not a genuine issue of fact decided in violation of section (c) of Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when a court on motion for summary judgment invalidates a duly issued United States Letters Patent as anticipated by a file wrapper reference, there being a contest on that issue?

Reasons Relied on for Allowance of the Writ

1. The Court of Appeals has decided an important question of Federal law on which there are conflicting decisions by Circuit Courts of Appeals and by District Courts.

2. The Court of Appeals has decided an important question of Federal law which has not been, but should be, settled by this Court.

Prayer

Wherefore your petitioner respectfully prays that a Writ of Certiorari be issued to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit to the end that this cause may be reviewed and determined by this Court and that your petitioner may have such other and further relief in the premises as to this Court may seem meet and just.

Morris Kirschstein,
Attorney for Petitioner.

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1949.

No.

FRANCIS H. MONTMARQUET, d/b/a
O. C. MANUFACTURING COMPANY,

Petitioner,

—against—

JOHNSON & JOHNSON,

Respondent.

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Opinions of the Courts Below

The opinion of the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey is reported in 82 F. Supp. 469.

The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit is reported in 179 F. 2nd 240.

Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked on the grounds set forth in the accompanying petition for Writ of Certiorari.

Statement of the Case

The essential facts of the case are stated in the accompanying petition for Writ of Certiorari.

Specification of Errors

The error which petitioner will urge, if this Writ of Certiorari is issued, is that the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit erred in affirming the District Court upon the opinion of the District Court and in thereby holding:

1. That the patent at bar could be invalidated without passing upon a genuine issue as to a material fact; and

2. That the complaint should be dismissed.

ARGUMENT

I.

The Court of Appeals has decided an important question of Federal Law on which there are conflicting decisions by Circuit Courts of Appeals and by District Courts.

The Court summarily held petitioner's patent invalid for lack of invention in view of prior art. The issue of validity of a patent over the art when tested by the presence or absence of patentable novelty is one of fact. (*Graver Tank & Mfg. Co.* v. *Linde Air Prod. Co.*, 93 L. ed. 492.)

Yet there is a conflict of decisions in the Federal Courts as to whether the question of validity of a patent for lack of invention over the prior art presents a genuine issue of fact such as to bar summary disposition.

Some courts have definitely held they will not grant summary judgment in such cases. Others have granted them.

The weight of authority is against granting them because the courts zealously guard a litigant's right to his day in court.

In the following cases the courts have refused to grant motions for summary judgments ~~dismissing~~ INVALIDATING patents for lack of patentable novelty over the prior art:

Bowers v. *E. J. Rose Mfg. Co.*, 149 F. 2d 612 C. C. A. 9.

"Even assuming there were such a conversion to a trial by affidavits in a case where, as here, the issues are clearly drawn in the pleadings, the juridical function exercised by the court in determining anticipation on the evidence in affidavits is in an action tried upon the facts upon which a final judgment is determined, and hence requiring findings of fact and conclusions of law thereon under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.[2] None was made.

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2 Rule 52. Findings by the court.
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon and direct the entry of the appropriate judgment; * * *." (Page 616)

Weil v. *N. J. Richman Co.*, 34 F. Supp. 401, D. C., S. D. New York.

"The various facts affecting patentability cannot adequately be dealt with except after proof at the final hearing. (Citing a case)" (Page 402)

Engineering Specialties Co. v. *Burgess Battery Co.*, 40 F. Supp. 1014, D. C., S. D. New York.

"Plaintiff's patent has never been adjudicated and the fact that certain references herein were before the

Patent Office lends greater presumptive force to the issuance of said patent. (Citing a case). In view of this presumption of validity of plaintiff's patent, defendant's contention that said patent does not evidence sufficient improvement over the prior art to constitute invention should be resolved upon a trial wherein experts of both parties may be subjected to cross-examination. (Citing cases)" (page 1015)

Baker v. *First Nat. Stores,* 64 F. Supp. 979, D. C., D. Massachusetts.

"Since the Patent Office has granted a patent on this device there is at least some color of patentable invention, and the plaintiff is entitled to his day in court on these issues. Patent validity is an issue not rightly disposed of by summary judgment. (Citing a case)" (page 980)

See also:

Refractolite Corporation v. *Prismo Holding Corporation,* 25 F. Supp. 965, D. C., S. D. New York;
Bliss Co. v. *Cold Metal Process Co.,* 47 F. Supp. 897, 899, D. C., N. D. Ohio, E. D.
American Optical Co. v. *New Jersey Optical Co.,* 58 F. Supp. 601, 605, D. C., D. Massachusetts.

In the following cases courts have granted motions for summary judgment for lack of patentable novelty over the prior art:

Davison Chemical Corp. v. *Joliet Chemicals,* 179 F. 2d 793 C. C. A. 7.

"His prescription for that process, we have held, did not constitute invention. We are unable to find re-

maining any genuine issue of fact between plaintiff and defendants. Consequently, the court rightfully allowed the motion for summary judgment. Such practice in similar cases is not new. (Citing cases)" (page 795)

See also:

Juniper Mills v. *J. W. Landenberger & Co.*, 6 F. R. D. 463, D. C., E. D. Pennsylvania.

We do not include, because outside the conflict of authority, those cases where a motion for summary judgment of patent invalidity was granted on purely legal grounds such as failure to disclaim, etc., since in these cases there is no genuine issue of fact.

II.

The Court of Appeals has decided an important question of Federal Law which has not been, but should be, settled by this Court.

The question of whether summary judgment may be granted under Rule 56 holding a patent invalid for lack of patentable novelty over the prior art appears never to have been decided by this Court. The circuit courts of appeal and the district courts are in conflict on this issue. What is involved is a matter of procedure vital to the administration of justice in the federal courts with particular reference to the Patent Statutes. What is here challenged basically, is the right of a district court to decide under Rule 56 a genuine issue of fact.

The District Court here misconstrued its function. It is for a district court sitting in Trial Term to assess the

evidence and decide issues of fact. When sitting in Motion Term the court's function under Rule 56 is only to determine if a genuine issue of fact is presented. Once such an issue is found to exist, as was the case here, the district court must deny the motion for summary judgment so that the issue may be tried.

On such motion the District Court's opinion as to how the issue ultimately should be resolved is not material; for unless the issue is frivolous a litigant is entitled to his day in court (*Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland* v. *United States,* 187 U. S. 315, 320). Were the law otherwise, a court could always on summary motion substitute its opinion for that of the trier of the facts. The absurd result then would follow that even where, as here, there is a sharp conflict in the evidence as to a genuine issue of fact, a court on motion for summary judgment, having reached an opinion as to how the issue *should* be decided were the case before it at Trial Term, would so decide that issue and terminate the litigation without actual trial.

If such procedure should be sanctioned the rule would become a vice instead of a virtue. For with the desire of courts to clear calendars, it is not inconceivable that many a district court mistaking its role under Rule 56 will decide genuine issues of fact on motions for summary judgment.

Respectfully submitted,

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JACOB T. BASSECHES,
JAMES V. MCNAMARA.

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Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1949.

No. 765

FRANCIS H. MONTMARQUET, d/b/a
O. C. MANUFACTURING COMPANY,

Petitioner,

—against—

JOHNSON & JOHNSON,

Respondent.

REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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JAMES V. MCNAMARA.

INDEX

PAGE

REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Point I 1

Point II 2

POINT III 3

AUTHORITY CITED:

American Optical Co. v. New Jersey Optical Co., 58 Fed. Supp. 601, 605 2

Bischoff v. Wethered, 9 Wall. 812, 815, 816 2

Coupe v. Royer, 155 U. S. 565, 577-580 2

St. Paul Plow Works v. Starling, 140 U. S. 184, 196, 197 2

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1949.

No.

FRANCIS H. MONTMARQUET, d/b/a
O. C. MANUFACTURING COMPANY,

Petitioner,

—against—

JOHNSON & JOHNSON,

Respondent.

REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

I.

Respondent has not met the basic issue presented in this petition, namely, whether summary judgment properly can be granted under Rule 56, holding a patent invalid for lack of invention in view of the prior art. This is made clear by the very cases on which respondent relies. In *U. S.* v. *Esnault-Pelterie,* respondent's brief, page 4, the very language quoted shows that "all the evidence (was) before the Court." Indeed a full trial (hearing before the Court of Claims) with special findings, 303 U. S., page 27, had been had.

Validity is an issue of fact (see Petitioner's brief, page 10 and page 2, *infra*). Here, petitioner was precluded from offering full evidence on this issue. A patentee should not be restricted to merely what he can develop on affidavits in resisting a motion for summary judgment.

He is entitled to a full trial in open court where all available evidence could be submitted.

The other cases relied on by respondent, *Singer Co.* v. *Cramer* and *Ryan Distributing Corp.* v. *Caley* (Respondent's brief, pages 4 and 5) are also clearly cases where all the evidence was before the Court. In each of these cases there had been a full trial on the merits. Here, the petitioner has been precluded from trial altogether.

II.

Moreover, *Singer Co.* v. *Cramer* dealt only with the issue of infringement. Cases granting motions for summary judgment for non-infringement are outside the conflict of authority referred to in the petition. Such cases (to quote from *American Optical Co.* v. *New Jersey Optical Co.*, 58 Fed. Supp. 601, 605) relate

> "* * * to the construction or interpretation of the patent claims, i.e., whether a given element is or is not included within the claim. Determination of the meaning of the patent claims can be made from the face of the instrument, as in a written contract. This involves questions of law for the Court, not of fact for a jury." (Citing *Coupe* v. *Royer,* 155 U. S. 565 and *Singer Mfg. Co.* v. *Cramer.*)

Validity, in contrast with infringement, has repeatedly been held by this Court to present a question of fact. See the very cases referred to in *U. S.* v. *Esnault-Pelterie,* 303 U. S., page 31, immediately following the quotation relied on by respondent on page 4 of its brief; to-wit: *Bischoff* v. *Wethered,* 9 Wall. 812, 815, 816; *St. Paul Plow Works* v. *Starling,* 140 U. S. 184, 196, 197; *Coupe* v. *Royer,* 155 U. S. 565, 577-80.

III.

Respondent insists that here there was no genuine issue of fact and at pages 5 to 6 of its brief seeks to differentiate petitioner's cases by pointing in some of these cases to the presence of affidavits of fact in opposition and contradicting affidavits of experts whereby such an issue was created. Respondent appears to have lost sight of the fact that in this case, too, affidavits were presented in opposition to the motion for summary judgment (Petition, page 4) and that these affidavits were not controverted.

Respectfully submitted,

MORRIS KIRSCHSTEIN,
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JAMES V. MCNAMARA.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
Opinions Below	1
Jurisdiction	1
Question Presented	1
Statement	2
Argument	3
Conclusion	6

TABLE OF CASES CITED

Baker v. *First National Stores,* D. C. Mass., 64 F. Supp. 979	6
Bowers v. *E. J. Rose Mfg. Co.,* 9 Cir., 149 F. 2d 612	5
Engineering Specialties Co. v. *Burgess Battery Co.,* S. D. N. Y., 40 F. Supp. 1014	6
Ryan Distributing Corp. v. *Caley,* 3 Cir., 147 F. 2d 138 (cert. denied 325 U. S. 859)	5
Singer Co. v. *Cramer,* 192 U. S. 265	4
U. S. v. *Esnault-Pelterie,* 303 U. S. 26	4
Weil v. *N. J. Richman Co.,* S. D. N. Y., 34 F. Supp. 401	6

TABLE OF STATUTES CITED

Judicial Code, Title 28 § 1254(1)	1
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure	2

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM 1949

FRANCIS H. MONTMARQUET, d.b.a.
The O. C. Manufacturing Company,
Petitioner,

v.

JOHNSON & JOHNSON,
Respondent.

No. 765

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

Opinions Below

The opinion of the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey is reported at 82 F. Supp. 469.

The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit is reported at 179 F. 2d 240.

Jurisdiction

Petitioner invokes the jurisdiction of this court under the Judicial Code, Title 28 § 1254(1).

The judgment of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which petitioner seeks to have reviewed, was entered on January 23, 1950.

Question Presented

Did the lower courts resolve a *genuine* issue of fact in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding the patent in suit invalid?

Statement

The patent in suit relates to athletic supporters (jock straps). These articles have a belt, or waistband, which may extend either substantially horizontally around the body of the wearer, just as a trousers belt does, or it may have a "drop front" several inches lower than the back.

The patent in suit relates to supporters with "drop fronts". The supposed invention is said to be in the particular way the belt is folded, or overlapped, to make the "drop front".

The prior Johnson patent 1,155,659 (R. 60a) shows a catamenial belt with a drop front, provided by a fold in exactly the same manner as in the patent in suit. Also, as in the patent in suit, the horizontal portion produced by Johnson's fold, is used to support the functional member, which in this instance is a sanitary napkin for menstrual purposes.

The prior Cartledge, British patent 494,393 (R. 61a) also shows a drop front supporter and in the following language (R. 62a):

> "Of course, joint 2 need not necessarily be the ends of the band, for, though not preferred, the *angle may be provided by a fold* while the ends may meet anywhere around the body."

describes a construction which is precisely like that of the patent in suit.

Defendant moved for summary judgment under the provisions of Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, asserting that the patent in suit was neither valid nor infringed (R. 13a).

"Rule 56
"Summary Judgment
* * * * *

"(b) For Defending Party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought may, at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof.

"(c) * * * The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that *there is no genuine issue as to any material fact* and that the *moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.*"

The District Court granted the motion on the ground that the patent in suit was invalid, and being invalid, was not infringed. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Argument

Because this is the only suit in which petitioner's patent has been adjudicated, there is no conflict of decisions regarding it.

Nor is there any special or important reason for granting this petition, as required by Rule 38 of this court.

The only question involved is whether there was a *genuine* issue as to any material fact. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held there was not.

There may be, and frequently are, questions of fact to be decided when a court determines a question of patent validity. But it does not follow that validity must always be decided as a question of fact.

The Patent Office history of the patent in suit and the prior patents upon which the defendant relied, were all before the court. There was, and could be, no dispute as to what these documents said. They spoke for themselves and no amount of testimony by expert witnesses, or others, including plaintiff, could vary the language of these documents in the slightest degree.

Where no extrinsic evidence is necessary for a complete understanding of the documents involved, *the court should regard validity as a matter of law.* The lower court clearly understood this rule and cited in support thereof the case of *U. S.* v. *Esnault-Pelterie,* 303 U. S. 26. This court there said (p. 30):

> "We are not unmindful of the rule that where, with all the evidence before the court, it appears that no substantial dispute of fact is presented, and that the case may be determined by a mere comparison of structures and extrinsic evidence is not needed for purposes of explanation, or evaluation of prior art, or to resolve questions of the application of descriptions to subject-matter, the questions of invention and infringement may be determined as questions of law. *Heald* v. *Rice,* 104 U. S. 737, 749; *Singer Mfg. Co.* v. *Cramer,* 192 U. S. 265, 275; *Sanitary Refrigerator Co.* v. *Winters,* 280 U. S. 30, 36."

In *Singer Co.* v. *Cramer,* 192 U. S. 265, 275, this court dealt with the issue of infringement (but the rule is equally applicable to validity). It said:

> "As in each of the patents in question it is apparent from the face of the instrument that extrinsic evidence is not needed to explain terms of art therein, or to apply the descriptions to the subject matter, and as we are able from mere comparison to comprehend what are the inventions described in each patent and

from such comparison to determine whether or not the Diehl device is an infringement upon that of Cramer, the question of infringement or no infringement is one of law and susceptible of determination on this writ of error."

The rule is also clearly stated in *Ryan Distributing Corp.* v. *Caley,* 3 Cir., 147 F. 2d 138 (cert. denied 325 U. S. 859). Plaintiff brought a declaratory judgment suit to have a patent declared invalid or not infringed; defendant counterclaimed for infringement. The lower court set aside the jury's verdict for defendant and entered judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appealed. In affirming, the court said (pp. 140; 141; 142):

> "The issue of invention is ordinarily one for the trier of fact. (Citing cases.) But in any question of fact, 'a verdict will normally be directed where both the facts and the inferences to be drawn therefrom, as supported by the overwhelming weight of the evidence, point so strongly in favor of one party or the other that the court feels reasonable men could not possibly come to a contrary conclusion.' 3 Moore's Federal Practice, p. 3104. * * * Whatever the extent of the power in patent cases may be it is certainly as wide upon the question of invention as upon any other question, ordinarily treated as one of fact, but called a 'question of law' when its decision becomes the responsibility of the judge. (Citing cases). That responsibility was properly assumed by the trial judge in this case."

The four cases upon which plaintiff relies and quotes in its brief, are readily distinguishable, and are not pertinent.

Thus, in *Bowers* v. *E. J. Rose Mfg. Co.,* 9 Cir., 149 F. 2d 612, 616, the court said:

> "Here the affidavits of fact are so in opposition that there is a 'genuine issue as to a material fact,' and

> hence no warrant for a summary judgment within Rule 56 (b) and (c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."

In *Weil* v. *N. J. Richman Co.*, S. D. N. Y., 34 F. Supp. 401, 402, the court said:

> "I believe there is a very grave question as to whether or not there is an infringement."

In *Engineering Specialties Co.* v. *Burgess Battery Co.*, S. D. N. Y., 40 F. Supp. 1014, the court referred to "the conflicting affidavits of the experts" on the motion for summary judgment.

In *Baker* v. *First National Stores,* D. C. Mass., 64 F. Supp. 979, the patent in suit (unlike the simple device of the present case) was for a machine for dispensing wax paper packages and defendant was moving for summary judgment on the ground of "misuse" of the patent. The Court said there was no "misuse" and then went on to refer to validity, making the statements quoted in petitioner's brief which are merely *dicta.*

CONCLUSION

The Courts below correctly decided there was no genuine issue of fact and that the patent in suit was invalid. No reason appears for the grant of a writ of certiorari.

The petition should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

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